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What will follow the demise of privatised Keynesianism?1 
 
Abstract: There have now been two successive policy regimes since World War II that 
have temporarily succeeded in reconciling the uncertainties and instabilities of a 
capitalist economy with democracy’s need for stability for people’s lives and capitalism’s 
own need for confident mass consumers. The first of these was the system of public 
demand management generally known as Keynesianism. The second was not, as has often 
been thought, a neo-liberal turn to pure markets, but a system markets alongside 
extensive housing and other debt among low- and medium-income people linked to 
unregulated derivatives markets. It was a form of privatised Keynesianism. This 
combination reconciled capitalism’s problem, but in a way that eventually proved 
unsustainable. After its collapse there is debate over what will succeed it. Most likely is 
an attempt to re-create it on a basis of corporate social responsibility. 
 
Keywords: privatised Keynesianism; financial crisis; corporate social responsibility; 
capitalism and democracy. 
 
Since the end of the Second World War two regimes have successively 
dominated the political economies of advanced capitalist economies; both lasted 
around 30 years before ending in some disarray. We now stand at the brink of a 
third, largely unknown one; what will its shape be? The first was the Keynesian 
strategy of demand management (assisted in several countries by neo-corporatist 
industrial relations systems). This more or less collapsed under the weight of the 
inflationary pressures from commodity price rises in the 1970s. It gave way to 
something generally called neo-liberalism, but which following the crisis of 
autumn 2008 we can now see to have been a regime of privatised Keynesianism. 
Under original Keynesianism it was governments that took on debt to 
stimulate the economy. Under the privatised form individuals, particularly poor 
ones, took on that role by incurring debt on the market. The main motors were 
the near-constant rise in the value of owner-occupied houses and apartments 
alongside an extraordinary growth in markets in risk. This regime collapsed, 
partly during a repetition of energy and other commodity inflation, but largely 
because of certain internal contradictions. 
Both regimes have had to manage an important contradiction, or at least 
tension: that between the insecurity and uncertainty created by the requirements 
of the market to adapt to shocks, and the need for democratic politics to respond 
to citizens’ demands for security and predictability in their lives. That there are 
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tensions in the relationship between capitalism and democracy may surprise 
those who, particularly in the USA, use those terms as virtual synonyms, but 
over the issue of security in working life it is fundamental. There is a further, 
related, tension within advanced capitalism itself, which needs on the one hand 
consumers on whose confidence firms can depend when planning their 
production, and on the other a capacity to respond to periods of declining 
demand by reducing the quantity and wages of labour, which in turn 
undermines consumer confidence. The tension can never be ‘resolved’ as it is 
endemic to the only successful form of political economy that we know; it has to 
be managed, by a series of regimes that will always in the end wear out and need 
to be replaced by something else. 
The basic conundrum was the ambiguous gift that democracy gradually 
presented to capitalism during the 20th century. Before that time the great mass of 
populations had been sustained on low incomes that rose only very slowly. Ideas 
of consumer confidence, if understood at all, applied to small, wealthier parts of 
the public. Demands by the mass of the population for a better life seemed 
impossible to accommodate, and although early social policy in Germany, 
France, Britain and elsewhere tried to put a basic floor under the insecurity of 
working-class life, its ambitions were limited. Fears about the revolutionary 
implications of democracy still led many elites to rely on repression, initially of a 
reactionary, later of a fascist and Nazi kind. 
As is well known, the first answer to the problem came in the early 20th 
century from the mass production system of manufacture associated initially 
with the Ford Motor Company in the USA. Technology and work organisation 
could enhance the productivity of low-skilled workers, enabling goods to be 
produced more cheaply and workers’ wages to rise, so that they could afford 
more of the goods. The mass consumer became a reality. It is significant that the 
breakthrough occurred in the large country that came closest to a basic idea of 
democracy (albeit on a racial basis) during that period. Democracy as well as 
technology contributed to construction of the model. However, as the Wall Street 
crash of 1929, coming just a few years after the launch of the Fordist model, 
showed, the problem of reconciling the instability of the market with consumer-
voters’ need for stability remained unresolved. This is where what became 
known as the Keynesian model came in, as will be briefly described below. How 
its successor squared the circle is more complex; analysing it will take us to the 
heart of the current crisis. Finally, we shall try to peer into the future. 
 
The ingredients, achievements and vulnerability of the Keynesian model 
How the Keynesian demand management model was supposed to operate is 
widely understood. In times of recession, when confidence was low, 
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governments would go into debt in order to stimulate the economy with their 
own spending. In times of inflation, when demand was excessive, they would 
reduce their spending, pay off their debts, and reduce aggregate demand. The 
model implied large state budgets, to ensure that changes within them would 
have an adequate macro-economic effect. For the British and some other 
economies this possibility occurred only with the vast rise in military 
expenditure required by the Second World War. Previous wars had seen large 
rises in state spending, always followed by a major reduction afterwards. World 
War II was different, in that military spending was replaced by that on the new, 
growing welfare state. 
The Keynesian model protected ordinary people from the rapid 
fluctuations of the market that had brought instability to their lives, smoothing 
the trade cycle and enabling them gradually to become confident mass 
consumers of the products of a therefore equally confident mass production 
industry. Unemployment was reduced to very low levels. The welfare state not 
only provided instruments of demand management for governments, but also 
brought real services in areas of major importance to people outside the 
framework of the market: more stability. 
Arms-length demand management plus the welfare state protected the 
rest of the capitalist economy from both major shocks to confidence and attacks 
from hostile forces, while the lives of working people were protected from the 
vagaries of the market. It was a true social compromise. As conservative critics 
pointed out from the start, there was always likely to be a ratchet effect in the 
mechanism: it was easy for governments to increase spending in a recession, 
bringing lower unemployment, more public services, and more money in 
people’s pockets. It would be far more difficult at times of boom in a democracy 
to reverse these trends. This was the seed of destruction at the heart of the model. 
We shall come to it shortly. First we must take a look at the political 
circumstances that ushered the model into practical reality, for the ideas that 
were incorporated in it had been around for 15 to 20 years. 
Karl Marx famously wrote that at particular moments of historical crisis 
particular social classes were in a position where their particular interests 
coincided with the general interest of society. Such classes triumphed in the 
revolutions in which the crises ended. Marx’s error was to believe that when the 
class concerned became the international proletariat there would be an end to the 
process, because the proletariat was the generality of society and not just a 
particular interest within it. This was an error if only because it is impossible to 
imagine anything as vast as the global proletariat producing organisational 
forms that could express a shared interest. Be that as it may, the Keynesian 
model did represent a temporary coincidence between the interests of the 
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industrial working class in the global north-west and a general interest of the 
politico-economic system. This was the class likely to threaten political and social 
order. It was also potentially the class whose mass consumption, if facilitated and 
made secure, could fuel economic growth of a kind unprecedented in human 
history. It was also a class that had produced political parties, trade unions and 
other organisations, as well as associated intellectuals, to shape and press its 
demands. The Keynesian model, combined with Fordist production, was a 
response to these demands that reconciled them with a capitalist system of 
production. 
Behind these generalisations rests a more diverse picture. The basic 
approach was embodied in public policy a decade before the end of World War 
II in two places – Scandinavia and the USA – in both cases as the result of 
coalitions between forces representing industrial workers and small farmers. The 
US New Deal in this complete form was only a temporary arrangement. The 
Scandinavian labour movements, far more powerful than the US one, were able 
to take the model forward to its welfare-state form, joined for a time in that effort 
after the war by the then also powerful British labour movement. 
The labour movements of continental Europe, crushed by war, fascism 
and Nazism, and divided among themselves by religion, were far weaker. The 
Keynesian model as such developed more slowly, and governments took 
different means to stabilise economies. In some countries, particularly France 
and Italy, there were real possibilities of communist domination of the labour 
movement. Governments had to ensure that working-class life escaped the 
insecurity of the 1920s and 1930s.  State ownership of important parts of the 
economy, combined with agricultural subsidies to ensure that still large peasant 
populations would not join the radicalism of industrial workers, were used to 
provide the stability in the early years. They were not so subtle as Keynesian 
policies, and permitted considerably more state intervention in the economy, 
while consumer demand was slow to rise. However, the outcome was similar in 
terms of protecting workers’ incomes from market fluctuations. In time demand 
management and strong welfare states also appeared in these economies. 
Meanwhile, the vast injections of Marshall Aid from the USA meant that public 
spending – in this case another country’s public spending – further stimulated 
the economies and maintained the security of working people’s lives. 
Germany was even more of an outlier. It benefited fully from Marshall 
Aid, but did not formally adopt Keynesianism until the late 1960s, when the 
model was nearing the end of its period of dominance. The initial German 
economic recovery did not depend on domestic consumer demand but on capital 
goods production (to re-establish production facilities) and exports. The 
country’s own formal economic policy stance depended on balanced budgets, an 
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autonomous central bank, and a high priority on avoiding inflation: major 
ingredients of the neo-liberal model that was to succeed the Keynesian one. It can 
however be argued that the German economy was during this period dependent 
for its stability, not on pure markets, but on a general Keynesian environment, or 
on other countries’ Keynesianism: US public spending through Marshall Aid and 
rising consumer demand in the USA, UK and elsewhere. 
Germany was not however an outlier in a further ingredient of the 
demand management model: neo-corporatist industrial relations. This had not 
been anticipated in Keynes’s own writings, and it featured hardly at all in US 
and only fitfully in British approaches; but it was fundamental to the Nordic, 
Dutch and Austrian cases. Under neo-corporatist industrial relations trade 
unions and employers associations have regard to the impact of their agreements 
on labour costs on the general level of prices, and particularly on export prices. 
This can work only if these organisations have sufficient authority over all firms 
to ensure that the terms of the deal are not significantly broken. The countries 
listed, where this kind of collective bargaining has been particularly important, 
are all small economies, heavily dependent on foreign trade. Broadly similar 
arrangements developed in Germany, the only large country involved, as part of 
the priority on export- as opposed to domestic-led growth of that economy. 
The importance of neo-corporatism for present purposes is that it 
addressed the Achilles’ heel of Keynesianism: the inflationary tendencies of its 
politically determined ratchet. Countries that had Keynesian policies but no or 
weak or neo-corporatism – before all others the UK and (though with less 
reliance on Keynesianism) the USA, but by the 1970s France and Italy too – were 
highly vulnerable to the inflationary shocks unleashed by the general rise in 
commodity prices during the 1970s, particularly the oil price rises of 1973 and 
1978. The wave of inflation that then affected the advanced countries of the West, 
though nothing like what had been experienced in Germany in the 1920s, or in 
various parts of Latin America more recently, more or less destroyed the model. 
 
On to privatised Keynesianism 
An intellectual challenge to Keynesianism had long been ready. The advocates of 
a return to ‘real’ markets had never ceased to be active, and a range of policies 
was in readiness. The key objective was to have governments withdraw from 
accepting overall responsibility for the economy. While for the purposes of this 
article we are concentrating on demand management, Keynesianism had become 
emblematic of a far wider range of policies of regulation, welfare provision and 
subsidy. The opposing set of ideas required an historical moment to justify their 
installation in the approaches of governments and international organisations. 
The 1970s inflationary crisis provided this. Within a decade or so such ideas as 
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the absolute priority of near-zero inflation at whatever cost in terms of 
unemployment, the withdrawal of state assistance to firms and industries in 
difficulties, the priority of competition, the predominance of a shareholder 
maximisation as opposed to a multiple stakeholder model of the corporation, the 
deregulation of markets and the liberalisation of global capital flows had become 
orthodoxy. Where governments in countries with weak economies were 
unwilling to accept them, they were imposed as conditions for assistance from or 
membership of such international bodies as the International Monetary Fund, the 
World Bank, the OECD or the European Union. When the Soviet Union 
collapsed in 1989, the more westerly of its former allies were brought within the 
scope of the new model. 
A further change that had taken place was the declining autonomy of the 
nation state. The post-war political economy had bee founded on the basis of 
governments that could exercise considerable discretion in how they managed 
their economies. By the 1980s the process generally known as globalisation, both 
a producer and a product of the deregulation of financial markets, had eroded 
much of that autonomy. The only actors capable of rapid action at global level 
were transnational corporations, who preferred their own private regulation 
over that by governments. This both advanced and even rendered necessary the 
new model. 
Just as a class – that of industrial workers – can be seen as the bearers of 
the Keynesian model, so we can identify a class whose particular interests 
seemed to embody the general interest in the new model: the class of finance 
capitalists, geographically grounded in the USA and the UK but extending across 
the globe. If the world was to gain from the liberation of productive forces and 
enterprise that the spread of free markets would bring, the class of those who 
dealt in the unregulated finance that massaged and helped those markets to 
grow would benefit particularly. Whereas the tight labour markets and regulated 
capitalism of the Keynesian period had seen a gradual reduction in inequalities 
of wealth in all advanced countries, the following period was to see a sharp 
reversal of these trends, with the highest rewards (at least in the western world) 
going to those working in and owning financial institutions. 
Two questions are immediately raised by this. First, what had been the 
fate of the industrial working class, whose interests had seemed so politically 
urgent in the 1940s and 1950s? And what become of the need to reconcile the 
instability of markets with people’s demand for security in their lives, which had 
been both politically and economically so important? 
The initial crisis of Keynesianism in the 1970s had been accompanied by 
an extraordinary wave of industrial militancy, such that one might have thought 
that the challenge of that class was becoming more rather than less important. 
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But this was an illusion. Rising productivity and the globalisation of production 
were in fact undermining its demographic base. Starting in the USA, the UK and 
Scandinavia, the share of employment in mining and manufacturing began to 
decline throughout the West. The militancy of the 1970s served only to 
encourage governments that were so inclined to lend their hand to hastening that 
decline, as occurred in the UK with reference to the coal and some other 
industries during the 1980s. Industrial workers had never constituted a majority 
of the working population anywhere, but they had been the growing class; now 
they were declining. By the 1980s they had been replaced as leaders in industrial 
militancy by public employees, with whom governments could deal directly 
without disturbing the market economy much. The main growth sectors of the 
new economy, private services, were usually not organised and had developed 
no autonomous political agenda, no organisations to articulate their specific 
grievances. 
In the regime of largely unregulated international finance that was 
instituted during the 1980s, governments were far more worried about capital 
movements than labour movements: positively, in that they wanted to attract 
investment from free-floating capital with short time horizons; negatively in that 
they feared that such capital would move away if they did not provide 
conditions in which it was happy. 
However, as we have noted, the Keynesian model had met an economic 
demand from capitalists themselves for stable mass consumption as well as 
workers’ demands for stable lives. In the newly industrialising countries of South 
Asia and the Far East this was not a problem. Until very recently these largely 
undemocratic countries have depended on export markets rather than spending 
by the mass of their populations. But this was far from possible in the existing 
advanced economies. Indeed, dependence there on increased domestic 
consumption rather than exports had intensified rather than weakened. As the 
industries making many of the products bought in mass markets moved to new 
producing countries, or, if it remained became dependent on less and less labour, 
employment growth came to depend on markets in personally delivered 
services, which are not so subject to globalisation. It is easy to buy a Chinese T-
shirt in a western shop and benefit from low Chinese wages; it is hardly feasible 
to travel to China to get a cheap haircut. Immigration is the only way that 
globalisation affects such services, but its impact is limited by controls of 
population movements (which have not benefited from market liberalisation but 
have in general been intensified), and by the fact that immigrants’ wages, though 
usually low, are not as low as in their home countries. So the puzzle remains: if 
the instability of free markets had to be overcome to usher in the mass 
consumption economy, how did the latter survive the return of the former? 
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During the 1980s (or 1990s, depending on when the neo-liberal wave hit a 
particular economy) the answer first appeared to be a negative one, as rising 
unemployment and continuing recession became the dominant experience. Then 
things changed. By the end of the 20th century the UK and the US in particular 
were demonstrating declining unemployment and strong growth. One 
explanation might be that, in a really pure market economy, the rapid 
alternations of boom and bust associated with the earlier history of capitalism do 
not occur. In the perfect market there is perfect knowledge, rational actors can 
therefore perfectly anticipate what is going to happen, and can adapt their 
behaviour to produce a seamless web of adaptation. Did the USA and the UK 
really enter this nirvana at the turn of the century? 
No. Knowledge is far from perfect; exogenous shocks, whether hurricanes, 
wars or the actions of irrational people who do not behave as theory says they 
should, continue to impact on economies and to disturb calculations. As we now 
know, two things came together to rescue the neo-liberal model from the 
instability that would otherwise have been its fate: the growth of credit markets 
for poor and middle-income people, and of derivatives and futures markets 
among the very wealthy. This combination produced a model of privatised 
Keynesianism that occurred initially by chance, a real case of market 
entrepreneurship, but which gradually became a matter for public policy so 
important as to threaten the entire neo-liberal project. 
Instead of governments taking on debt to stimulate the economy, 
individuals did so. In addition to the housing market there was an extraordinary 
growth in opportunities for bank loans and, particularly important, in credit 
cards. It was common for people to hold cards from more than one credit-card 
company as well as several store-specific ones. 
This explains the great puzzle of the period: how did moderately paid 
American workers, who have little legal security against instant dismissal from 
their jobs, and salaries that might remain static for several years, maintain 
consumer confidence, when European workers with more or less secure jobs and 
annually rising incomes were bringing their economies to a halt by their 
unwillingness to spend? US house prices were rising every year; the proportion 
of the value of the house on which a loan could be raised was also rising until it 
reached more than 100%; credit card possibilities were growing. With some 
exceptions European property values remained stable. Credit card growth was 
slower.  
Europeans were told by orthodox experts that the answer to their 
economic problems lay in producing more and more labour insecurity and 
cutting back on their welfare states. They eventually more or less obeyed, but 
found few positive results. No-one told them that these insecure workers would 
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need to be enabled to take on unsecured debt in order to boost consumer 
spending.  
In Anglo-America the anti-inflation bias of public policy further 
encouraged the model. Anti-inflationary policy bears down on the prices of 
goods and services that lose their value as they are consumed. Producers of food, 
material goods and services like restaurants or health centres confront an 
environment hostile to rises in their prices. This is not the case with assets, things 
that do not lose their value in this ways: real property, financial holdings, some 
art objects. A rise in their price is simultaneously a rise in their value, and does 
not contribute to inflation. It was seen as an act of political manipulation when 
the UK government removed mortgage repayments, but not rent, from its 
calculations of inflation, but it was technically quite correct. Therefore assets, and 
earnings based on assets, have not been the objects of neo-liberal counter-
inflation policy. Anything that could be switched from prices and wages derived 
from the sale of normal goods and services to an asset base therefore did very 
well. This applied to proportions of salaries paid as share options and to 
spending funded by extended mortgages rather than by salaries and wages. 
Eventually governments, especially British ones, began to incorporate 
privatised Keynesianism into their public policy thinking, though the phrase did 
not occur to them. While a reduction in the price of oil would be seen as good 
news (because it reduced inflationary pressure), a reduction in the price of 
houses would be seen as a disaster (as it would undermine confidence in debt), 
and government would be expected to act through fiscal or other measures to get 
prices rising again. There had been an initial implicit public policy boost to the 
model back in the 1980s when the privatisation of council housing enabled large 
numbers of people on moderate incomes to take on mortgages and, later, to 
explore the scope for extended mortgages.  But the move to more explicit policies 
to have house price constantly rising crept up during the first years of the 21st 
century until the massive interventions into housing finance and the banking 
sector in general during 2007 and 2008. 
Most of this housing and consumer debt was necessarily unsecured; that 
was the only way in which privatised Keynesianism could have the same 
counter-cyclical stimulant effect as the original variety. Prudential borrowing 
against specified collateral certainly would not have helped the moderate-income 
groups who had to keep spending despite the insecurity of their labour market 
positions. The possibility of prolonged, widespread unsecured debt was in turn 
made possible through innovations that had taken place in financial markets, 
innovations which for a long time had seemed to be an excellent example of how, 
left to themselves, market actors hit on creative solutions. Through markets in 
derivatives and futures the great Anglo-American finance houses learned how to 
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trade in risk. They found they could buy and sell risky holdings provided only 
that purchasers were confident that they could find further purchasers in turn; 
and that depended on the same confidence. Provided markets were free from 
regulation and capable of extensive reach, these trades enabled a very 
widespread sharing of risk, which made it possible for people to invest in many 
ventures that would otherwise have seemed unwise.  
An inability to share risks widely had been at the heart of the economic 
collapses of 1929 and the 1870s. In the 1940s it had seemed that only state action 
could solve this problem for the market. But now, absolutely in tune with neo-
liberal ideology and expectations, was a market solution. And, through the links 
of these new risk markets to ordinary consumers via extended mortgages and 
credit card debt, the dependence of the capitalist system on rising wages, a 
welfare state and government demand management that had seemed essential 
for mass consumer confidence, had been abolished. 
 
After privatised Keynesianism: the responsible corporation? 
In the event it was only abolished for a few years. All theories of market 
economics depend on the assumption that market actors are perfectly informed, 
but privatised Keynesianism depended on what were presumed to be the very 
smartest actors concerned, the financial institutions of Wall Street and the City of 
London, having highly defective knowledge. This is the Achilles’ heel of this 
model, corresponding to the inflationary ratchet of original Keynesianism. Banks 
and other financial operators believed that each other had studied and calculated 
the risks in which they were trading. But during autumn 2008 it became clear 
that had they done so they would not have entered into many of the transactions 
they undertook. The only calculations made were that there was a good chance 
that someone else would buy a share in the risk. The only mystery is why, if they 
all behaved like that they somehow believed that all the others were not doing 
the same. Bad debts were funding bad debts, and so on in an exponentially 
growing mountain.  
Some people became extremely wealthy in the process, but this does not 
mean that they were parasites. They continued to be the class whose particular 
interests represented the general interest, because we all benefited from the 
growing purchasing power that this system generated. At least, this is true in the 
UK, USA and one or two other places. French, German and most other 
continental European citizens may feel differently, as their financial elites joined 
in the act, while they experienced little of the growth in credit. 
Once privatised Keynesianism had become a model of general economic 
importance, it became a kind of collective good, however nested in private 
actions it was. And given that necessary to it, powering it, was irresponsible 
  11 
behaviour by banks in failing to examine their asset bundles, that very 
irresponsibility became a collective good. This in itself explains why governments 
had to bail out the firms involved, more or less nationalising privatised 
Keynesianism. 
And so a second regime to reconcile stable mass consumption with the 
market economy ended. Both Keynesianism and its privatised mutant lasted 30 
years. As regimes in a rapidly changing world go, that is probably as good as it 
can get. But the question arises: how are capitalism and democracy to be 
reconciled now? Also, how will the enormous moral hazard established by 
governments’ recognition of financial irresponsibility as a collective good now be 
managed? The public policy response has not been ‘now stop all this’, but ‘please 
carry on borrowing and lending, but a little bit more carefully’. It has to be so; 
otherwise there will be a danger of real systemic collapse. 
Two things characterised the transition from pre-war economics to 
Keynesianism and that from original to privatised Keynesianism: the availability 
of alternative ideas and the existence of a class, serving whose interests would 
serve a general interest. It is fashionable to claim that at the present juncture we 
lack the former, while not noticing the latter. This is wrong on both points. 
Many of the ideas that constituted neo-liberalism had been lying around 
for more than 200 years when they were refashioned for public policy use during 
the 1970s. Today many of the components of the much younger mix of demand 
management and neo-corporatism are still around in the economic strategies of 
small states, usually today combined with portions of neo-liberalism too. Most 
widely noted, though not unique, is the Danish way of combining a strong 
welfare state and powerful trade unions with very flexible labour markets. That 
seems to square the circle of market flexibility and consumer confidence, as well 
as powering a dynamic and innovative economy. There is no shortage of policy 
mixes; only of coalitions of political forces capable of supporting them in the 
larger economies; and this returns us to the question of significant social classes. 
Just possibly the current arrogance of the financial sector, demanding the 
right to privatise gain and socialise loss, is an equivalent of the industrial 
militancy of the 1970s, the pride that went before an historical decline. But this is 
doubtful. Economic prosperity continues to depend on supplies of capital 
through efficient markets far more than it then depended on the industrial 
workers of the western world. A difference of geographical reach is part of the 
explanation. The decline of the western industrial working class does not mean a 
decline in that class globally. More people are engaged in manufacturing 
activities today than ever before; but they are divided into national, or at best 
world regional, lumps with very different histories and trajectories. Finance 
capital does not come in solid lumps but more like a liquid or gas, capable of 
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changing shape and flowing across jurisdictions and regions. We remain 
dependent on both labour and capital, but the former is subject to divide et 
imperia, the latter is not – unless we see a major return to economic nationalism 
and limitations on capital movements that will lead to the breakup of the major 
corporations that dominate the global economy and probable major economic 
decline. 
The most likely new model is one that in fact depends increasingly on 
those corporations; the logic of globalisation that imparted an important role to 
TNCs has not disappeared with the financial system. There has always been a 
tension at the centre of neo-liberalism: is it about markets or about giant firms? 
They are far from being the same: the more that a sector is dominated by giant 
firms, the less it resembles the pure market that in principle lies behind nearly 
most of today’s public policy. There may well be intense competition among 
giant firms, but it is not the competition of the pure market. This is supposed to 
be characterised by very large numbers of actors, such that each remains 
incapable of having an effect on prices by its own actions, and certainly incapable 
of wielding political influence. In the pure market everyone is a price taker; no-
one a price maker. The kind of strategic action – such as selling short – that has 
characterised contemporary financial markets simply cannot happen. 
Even while the neo-liberal epoch was just beginning, economists at the 
University of Chicago, usually considered to be the main centre for the 
generation of neo-liberal ideology, were preparing a new doctrine of competition 
and monopoly that was soon to influence the US courts, undermining the old 
principles of anti-trust legislation that were at the heart of US and, more recently, 
European competition law. It was not necessary, the doctrine argued, for there to 
be actual competition for customer welfare to be maximised. Sometimes a 
monopoly, by its very domination of the market can offer customers a better deal 
than a number of competing firms. 
This is not the place to examine the merits of this argument in detail. It is 
being used here only to show the fundamental ambiguity within neo-liberal 
thinking itself over what are usually seen as its fundamental characteristics: 
competition and freedom of choice. The recent banking crisis has seen, on both 
sides of the Atlantic, governments supporting, and gaining the support of 
competition authorities for, mergers and acquisitions that considerably reduce 
competition and choice.  
The financial markets failed when the fundamental criterion of complete 
knowledge and transparency ceased to characterise banks’ relations with each 
other. If we now add to that a sector with considerably reduced competition, as 
well as extended guarantees of support from the state in the event of 
irresponsible behaviour, we have a potentially serious problem of system 
  13 
legitimacy. At the same time, unless a country’s political structure is likely to 
support something like a ‘Danish’ solution, we remain dependent on the 
financial system to resume privatised Keynesianism if capitalism’s other problem 
with democracy is to be resolved. 
The initial answer is a return to more regulation to compensate for 
declining competition and to avoid moral hazard, and in the immediate term this 
is happening. But we have been here before very recently. After what was in 
retrospect the first sign that the financial markets were not as effective at 
automatic self-regulation as was claimed on their behalf, the Enron and 
World.com scandals at the beginning of the century, the US Congress tightened 
regulations on company auditing in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. It quickly produced 
complaints from the sector that enterprise was being stifled, and threats that 
finance houses would leave New York for the more permissive regime in 
London. 
The same has been happening after the bout of regulatory measures being 
visited on the financial sector as part of the deal with governments to save it. 
How can the derivatives markets get to work in supporting high levels of 
borrowing if they are to be subject to rules that make much of that borrowing 
more difficult? Meanwhile, low- and medium-wage, insecure workers will not be 
able to carry on spending unless they can get their hands on unsecured credit, 
even if at less maniac levels than had been occurring. Furthermore, this will be a 
financial sector with a reduced number of major players, with very easy access to 
government and often shaped by government itself during the course of the 2008 
rescue packages. One assumes that most governments that have been acquiring 
banks in the bout of unforeseen nationalisation that followed the October 2008 
collapse do not intend to hold on to them according to the old model of 
controlling the ‘commanding heights’ of the economy. The fact that big banks 
operate internationally will itself be a disincentive to that. It is however also 
unlikely that these banks will be privatised through general public share issues. 
They will most likely be levered into the hands of a small number of leading 
existing firms deemed responsible enough to run them in good order. There will 
overall be a gradual slip towards a more negotiated, voluntary regulatory 
system. Justified by arguments about flexibility and of reducing burdens on the 
taxpayer, actual regulation will be exchanged for lightly monitored guarantees of 
good behaviour by the large financial firms. 
To predict this is hardly crystal-ball gazing: it is a general trend in 
government-firm relations right across the economy. Sharing neo-liberal 
prejudices against government as such, frightened at the impact of regulation on 
growth, and believing in the superiority of corporate directors over themselves at 
nearly everything, politicians increasingly rely on corporate social responsibility 
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for the achievement of several policy goals. The UK government even has a 
minister with responsibility for the subject.  
Hardly a regime shift; just an adjectival shift from unregulated privatised 
Keynesianism to self-regulated privatised Keynesianism. But some implications 
of the change have more radical implications. First, the system will less and less 
be legitimated in terms of the market, freedom of choice and an absence of 
government involvement. Rather, there will be partnership between government 
and firms, or autonomous actions by firms commended by governments, with 
largely informal outcomes attempts to reconstruct trust. It will be ‘big firms are 
good for you’, rather than ‘markets are good for you’. In some respects this 
resembles neo-corporatism, but with two major differences. First, organised 
labour will not be present, except as a token actor, as it has little power or 
competence at the level of global finance. Second, firms participated in 
corporatist deals as members of associations, which provided something of a 
level playing field among different firms. Today’s giant, global firms have little 
time for associations, and seek anything but a level playing field when they build 
relations with governments. The new ‘responsible corporation’ model will 
however resemble corporatism in being limited to nation-state (just possibly EU) 
level, to which level governments’ competence is limited, while the firms remain 
global and retain a capacity to regime-shop. 
Second, and less important economically but more significant politically, 
this model will see a considerable enhancement of current trends towards a 
displacement of political activity from parties to civil society organisations and 
social movements. The model brings firms to prominence, not just as lobbies of 
governments, but as makers of public policy, either alongside or instead of 
governments. It will be firms that decide the terms of their codes of behaviour 
and responsible practices. Firms therefore become political subjects and objects in 
their own right, ending the sharp separation between governments and private 
firms that is the hallmark of both neo-liberal and social democratic politics. At 
the same time, as governments of all parties have to make similar deals with 
firms, and equally fear for their country’s ability to attract liquid capital if they 
are too demanding of them, differences among parties on core economic policies 
will shrink even further than they have already. Party politics will still have 
much with which to concern itself: the relative share of public spending; 
questions of multi-culturalism; security. But it will vacate the former heartland of 
basic economic strategy. In reality it vacated this some years ago in most 
countries, but shreds of it remain in some parties’ rhetoric. 
It is already the case that for nearly every major corporation there is a web 
site revealing details of its conduct, assessing its fulfilment of its social 
responsibility claims. As this remains a no-go area for party conflict, it will grow 
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in importance in civil society politics. It will have the major advantage that it will 
not be so trapped at the nation state level as party politics; many of these groups 
are transnational. But it will be an unsatisfactory politics, as it lacks the formal 
citizenship egalitarianism of electoral democracy, while retaining many of the 
bad habits of parties. Activist groups are capable of grabbing attention with 
exaggerated claims or (in contrast) cuddling up to corporations in exchange for 
various resources just as much as are parties. It will also be a highly unequal 
struggle between them and the corporations. It is not a regime that either neo-
liberals or social democrats want; but it is what we are all likely to get; and it 
may well reconcile again the capitalism economy and the democratic polity. 
This is the kind of social forecasting that depends on an extrapolation of 
current trends. Can one not do better than that and peer further forward? Before 
very long the global economy will start to need the purchasing power, and not 
just the labour power, of the billions living in Asia and Africa. That will require 
serious thinking about the transfer of spending power, not to mention an 
increase in the price of T-shirts, and a completely different kind of global regime. 
What would trigger such an emergence of something finally resembling Marx’s 
global proletariat? Probably not his own ideas; more likely radical Islam. But this 
is likely to become really serious politics after the next 30 years. 
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